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Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
Time: 1:41 am
Time: 1:41 am
Results for building security
5 results foundAuthor: Sheppard, Jill E. Title: Undertrained, Underpaid, and Unprepared: Security Officers Report Deficient Safety Standards in Manhattan Office Buildings Summary: Standards for New York City’s private security officers are alarmingly low. Despite the heightened orange security alert that the City has been under since 9/11, neither City leaders nor private building owners have taken the initiative to train security officers to respond to terrorism, interface with police, or work with firefighters during an emergency. Upon interviewing over 100 privately-contracted security officers who work in 39 major Class A commercial buildings, the Public Advocate’s Office finds that minimal training and limited enforcement of training requirements, combined with low pay, has left New York with a private security force that is ill-prepared to protect its public. At a time when the Department of Homeland Security has kept New York City at a code orange terror alert, the City, businesses and building owners should have utmost concern for the public’s security. Many officers report having much less training than the state requires or none at all, and have little to no background in pertinent areas such as antiterrorism protection. 25% of officers surveyed have less than a year of experience at the building where they work. This report will demonstrate why current security officer training standards and enforcement practices need to be improved, compare New York’s security standards to other large domestic and international cities, and explain why the City’s Class A building owners need to play a more prominent role in developing and maintaining a professional security force. Details: New York: Public Advocate for the City of New York, 2005. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 1, 2011 at: http://publicadvocategotbaum.com/policy/pdfs/securityofficersreport.pdf Year: 2005 Country: United States URL: http://publicadvocategotbaum.com/policy/pdfs/securityofficersreport.pdf Shelf Number: 121212 Keywords: Building SecurityPrivate SecuritySecurity Guards (New York City) |
Author: Montealegre, Francisco Title: Jobsite Security in Residential Construction Summary: Construction crime can cost a homebuilder hundreds to thousands of dollars each year. Theft and vandalism on construction sites is a common problem for the construction industry. Therefore, securing the jobsite is critical to avoid theft and vandalism. This thesis presents the effects that theft and vandalism have on the homebuilding industry as well as the common measures taken by residential contractors in Florida to curtail jobsite crime. Data for this research were obtained through a mailed survey. The survey participants consisted of Florida members of the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB). Based on 128 survey respondents the results of this research show that construction theft and vandalism incidents are serious problems but they can be minimized by taking precautionary measures. Most thefts are preventable, and if precautions are not taken, profits will be adversely impacted. Ignoring the problem does not only make the problem worse, but encourages criminals to attack again. A culture of planning and reporting crimes needs to be created among homebuilders in order to address this problem at the root. Details: Gainesville, FL: University of Florida, 2003. 75p. Source: Internet Resource: Master's Thesis: Accessed September 3, 2011 at: http://etd.fcla.edu/UF/UFE0001192/montealegre_f.pdf Year: 2003 Country: United States URL: http://etd.fcla.edu/UF/UFE0001192/montealegre_f.pdf Shelf Number: 122530 Keywords: Building SecurityConstruction TheftCrime PreventionHome SecurityVandalism |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Federal Courthouses: Improved Collaboration Needed to Meet Demands of a Complex Security Environment Summary: Safe and accessible federal courthouses are critical to the U.S. judicial process. The Federal Protective Service (FPS), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the U.S. Marshals Service (Marshals Service), within the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC), and the General Services Administration (GSA) are the federal stakeholders with roles related to courthouse security. As requested, this report addresses (1) attributes that influence courthouse security considerations and (2) the extent to which stakeholders have collaborated in implementing their responsibilities and using risk management. GAO analyzed laws and documents, such as security assessments; reviewed GAO's work on key practices for collaboration and facility protection; visited 11 courthouse facilities, selected based on geographic dispersion, age, size, and other criteria; and interviewed agency and judiciary officials. While the results from site visits cannot be generalized, they provided examples of courthouse security activities. Various attributes influence security considerations for the nation's 424 federal courthouses, which range from small court spaces to large buildings in major urban areas. According to DOJ data, threats against the courts have increased between fiscal years 2004 and 2010--from approximately 600 to more than 1,400. The Interagency Security Committee--an interagency group that develops standards for federal facility security--has assigned courthouses the highest security level because they are prominent symbols of U.S. power. Federal stakeholders have taken steps to strengthen their collaboration, such as establishing agency liaisons, but have faced challenges in implementing assigned responsibilities and using risk assessment tools. (1) A 1997 memorandum of agreement (MOA) outlines each stakeholder's roles and responsibilities and identifies areas requiring stakeholder coordination. However, at 5 of the 11 courthouses GAO visited, FPS and the Marshals Service were either performing duplicative efforts (e.g., both monitoring the courthouse lobby) or performing security roles that were inconsistent with their responsibilities. The judiciary and other stakeholders stated that having the Marshals Service and FPS both provide security services has resulted in two lines of authority for implementing and overseeing security services. Updating the MOA that identifies roles and responsibilities could strengthen the multiagency courthouse security framework by better incorporating accountability for federal agencies' collaborative efforts. (2) In 2008, Congress authorized a pilot program, whereby the Marshals Service would assume FPS's responsibilities to provide perimeter security at 7 courthouses. In October 2010, the judiciary recommended that the pilot be expanded. AOUSC noted general consensus among various stakeholders in support of the pilot and estimated the costs of expanding it, but AOUSC did not obtain FPS's views on assessing the pilot results or on how the expansion may affect FPS's mission. Additional analysis on the costs and benefits of this approach and the inclusion of all stakeholder perspectives could better position Congress and federal stakeholders to evaluate expansion options. (3) The Marshals Service has not always completed court security facility surveys (a type of risk assessment), as required by Marshals Service guidance. At 9 of the courthouses GAO visited, the Marshals Service had not conducted these surveys, but Marshals Service officials at some courthouses told us that they assessed security needs as part of their budget development process. However, these assessments are less comprehensive than the court security facility surveys required by Marshals Service guidance. FPS has faced difficulties completing its risk assessments, known as facility security assessments, and recently halted an effort to implement a new system for completing them. Furthermore, GAO found that the Marshals Service and FPS did not consistently share the full results of their risk assessments with each other and key stakeholders. Sharing risk assessment information could better equip federal stakeholders to assess courthouses' security needs and make informed decisions. GAO recommends DHS and DOJ update the MOA to, among other things, clarify stakeholders' roles and responsibilities and ensure the completion and sharing of risk assessments; and further assess costs and benefits of the perimeter pilot program, in terms of enhanced security, and include all stakeholders' views, should steps be taken to expand the program. DHS and DOJ concurred with GAO's recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2011. 51p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-857: Accessed October 31, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-857 Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-857 Shelf Number: 123186 Keywords: Building SecurityCourthousesHomeland SecurityRisk Assessment |
Author: Fautsko, Timothy F. Title: Status of Court Security in State Courts -- A National Perspective Summary: According to incident data gathered by the Center for Judicial and Executive Security (CJES), the number of security threats and violent incidents in court buildings has increased dramatically in recent years. While security threats and violent incidents are on the rise, available funding from state and local governments for security staffing and equipment to protect courts is becoming increasingly limited. The National Center for State Courts (NCSC) received a grant from the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) to produce a comprehensive report on the status of court building security in this country. The report is organized to assist state and local, as well as tribal, native, and territorial courts to improve court security by assessing the current state of affairs regarding court building and courtroom security, identifying critical needs to improve security, and matching available resources to identified gaps and needs. In the development of this report, significant information that NCSC compiled with respect to court building and courtroom security assessments was reviewed and analyzed. The review included an analysis of NCSC's security assessment reports of over 225 court buildings, which contain a wealth of information regarding what courts do and do not have in place in the way of policies, procedures, staffing, equipment, and training. Further, the review included a comprehensive analysis of the information and data gathered by CJES, which examined court building shootings, bombings, arson attacks, and other court-targeted acts of violence. In addition to the review and analysis component of the study, a comprehensive web survey of a number of state, local, tribal, native, and territorial courts was conducted. A telephone survey was also conducted of all state court security directors. The responses to both of the surveys were used to identify: (1) what various courts have in place in the way of security; (2) the most critical needs that courts have in relation to security; and (3) the sources of funding courts have utilized to address critical needs. Details: Williamsburg, VA: National Center for State Courts, 2013. 181p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 21, 2014 at: http://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/facilities/id/184 Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/facilities/id/184 Shelf Number: 132096 Keywords: Building SecurityCourt FacilitiesCourt SecurityState Courts |
Author: Townsley, Michael Title: Crime in High-Rise Buildings: Planning for Vertical Community Safety Summary: The aim of this research is to inform housing and planning policy development by exploring the variation in types and volumes of crime in a range of existing high-density communities. By analysing actual rates and types of crime, building management styles and perceptions of fear of crime, the research will reveal how policing and high-rise building management styles can coalesce to create safer vertical communities. The methodological approach was multi-method, comprising quantitative analysis, in depth interviews, a systematic observational instrument and resident surveys. The research was partitioned into three separate studies, each differentiated by the corresponding data sources and methodological approach. Qualitative analyses of police recorded crime incidents (Study 1) showed a high degree of concentration of crimes in a small proportion of high-rise buildings. This pattern was observed regardless of crime type or time of year. Building characteristics were examined and it was found that residential tenure appeared to have a relationship with the amount of crime recorded at the building level. Buildings with long-term residents recorded the lowest levels of crime, on average. Buildings with short-term tenancies (holiday apartments, hotels) had the next highest, and buildings with mixed tenure (both long and short term tenancies) recording the highest levels of crime. The second study took a subsample of high-rise buildings and used an observational protocol to make ratings about place management, guardianship, and physical security. The most notable finding was that unlike findings internationally, place management and active guardianship did not appear to be positively correlated. That is, theory would suggest that locations with high levels of active guardianship should also have high levels of place management, but we did not observe this at the buildings in our sample. Strong positive correlations between place management and territoriality, image and physical security were observed. The third study involved interviewing residents, police officers, and building managers with a focus on the relationship between perceptions of safety and high-rise living. The findings indicated that the tenure and design aspects of the buildings had a significant influence upon perceived safety and security. Buildings of mixed tenures (short term or holiday letting and longer term residential) were most vocal in discussing the challenges of security and safety. Importantly, design and building management alone are not the sole panacea and individuals also had to take responsibility for considering their safety and security within high density environments. Details: Canberra: Criminology Research Advisory Council, 2013. 142p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 17, 2014 at: http://www.criminologyresearchcouncil.gov.au/reports/1314/29-1112-FinalReport.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Australia URL: http://www.criminologyresearchcouncil.gov.au/reports/1314/29-1112-FinalReport.pdf Shelf Number: 132492 Keywords: Building SecurityCrime PreventionDesign Against CrimePhysical Security |